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Thomas M. Melsheimer *
Thomas B. Walsh, IV**
HIS Article reviews significant cases during the Survey period on the
subjects of confession and search and seizure from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, the Texas courts of appeals, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the United States Supreme
Court.
I. TEXAS CASES
A. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
During the Survey period, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals con-
fronted confusing issues arising from a defendant's assertion that evidence
has been obtained from him in violation of his right to counsel. This right
has two distinct constitutional bases. The Fifth Amendment has been inter-
preted as affording an accused a right to counsel during custodial interroga-
tion, and the Sixth Amendment specifically guarantees the right to counsel
after adversarial proceedings have been initiated.
In Upton v. State' a capital murder defendant moved to suppress two oral
statements he gave to the police. One led the police to discover the victim's
wallet; the other led to the discovery of the victim's body. Upton made the
first statement on June 25th, when he was in custody on suspicion of bur-
glary. Only the day before, Upton had met with an attorney for over an
hour. The attorney advised Upton not to make any statements to the police.
The attorney told the police that he had instructed Upton not to answer any
questions and that he expected to be retained to represent him. After the
lawyer left, the police resumed their questioning of Upton. When Upton
mentioned that his lawyer had instructed him not to answer any questions,
one officer replied, "Well he may be your lawyer, he's your employee, you
know. It's up to you."'2 The next day, Upton was arraigned for burglary.
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After his arraignment, upon further questioning, he provided the police in-
formation that led to the discovery of the victim's wallet.
Approximately two weeks later on July 4th, Upton was questioned again.
During this second questioning, he gave incriminating statements that led
police to the victim's body. He was subsequently indicted for capital
murder.
The Court of Criminal Appeals first concluded that Upton's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had attached to the capital murder charge for
purposes of both the June 25th and July 4th statements, even though Upton
had not been formally charged with the capital offense.3 The court rejected
a "technical" reading of the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence noting that,
although Upton had only been charged with burglary at the time he made
the incriminating statements, the burglary offense was used as a predicate for
the capital murder charge.4
The court went on to conclude that Upton was indeed represented by
counsel at the time he made the statements. Because the police may initiate
interrogation in such a circumstance "only through notice to defense coun-
sel," Upton's statements should have been suppressed. 5 Although not neces-
sary to its resolution of the suppression issue, the court also noted that
Upton's statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. When Upton told the police that his lawyer had advised him not to
make any statements, this constituted, in the court's view, "an equivocal
request for counsel under the Fifth Amendment."' 6 The officer's reply -
"It's up to you" - did not sufficiently clarify whether Upton desired to have
his lawyer present for any additional questioning. The officer's failure to so
inquire "tainted the entire ensuing interrogation process."' 7 Because the
court concluded that Upton's reference to his lawyer created a duty to in-
quire, it did not need to address the issue of whether Upton's statement
amounted to an indication of his desire to exercise his right to counsel.
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION
During the Survey period, several Texas courts dealt with a common issue
in the litigation of "seizures" under federal and Texas constitutional law -
what quantum of circumstances qualifies as reasonable suspicion sufficient to
warrant an investigatory detention. The issue of "reasonable suspicion"
arose in several different contexts.
In Saenz v. State the en banc Court of Criminal Appeals considered the
question of reasonable suspicion in the context of a border stop. A border
patrol officer stopped Mr. Saenz between Marfa and Presidio, approximately
fifty-three miles north of the Mexican border. Saenz had committed no traf-
3. Id. at 555.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 557.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 842 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
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fic violations. The officer instructed Saenz that he was conducting a routine
immigration check. Saenz appeared nervous and the officer asked to search
the vehicle's trunk. Saenz consented and the officer discovered marijuana.
Saenz moved to suppress the marijuana seized from his trunk. The trial
court denied the motion and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 9 The
appellate court relied on the "border stop" factors of United States v.
Brignoni - Ponce'0 to reverse the lower court's ruling."
Brignoni - Ponce articulated eight factors for a reviewing court to consider
in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists for a border stop. These
factors include: proximity to the border, the vehicle's load, information on
recent illegal border crossings in the area, and the officer's experience in de-
tecting alien smuggling. 12 According to the Saenz court, only one factor
supported a finding of reasonable suspicion here - the experience of the
officer. All other factors argued against a finding of reasonable suspicion or
were at best neutral. The court concluded that the officer's experience,
standing alone, could not support the stop of Saenz's vehicle.' 3
Barely three weeks after its decision in Saenz, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals again considered the reasonable suspicion issue in Montana v. State,' 4
this time in the context of an airport stop. In Montano Houston police de-
tained two suspects on the basis of the following observations: (1) the sus-
pects appeared nervous; (2) the suspects bypassed a ticket counter before
heading to the concourse; (3) one of the suspects was wearing a heavy jacket
though it was a warm day; (4) one suspect handed his carry-on bag to the
other before going through the magnometer; and (5) the suspects identified
their airline as Northwest but that airline did not fly to their stated destina-
tion at that hour.
The court, relying on its previous holding in Crockett v. State, 5 held that
the suspects' conduct did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.' 6 To
amount to reasonable suspicion, the "conduct must have been sufficiently
distinguishable from that of innocent people under the same circumstances
as to clearly, if not conclusively, set [the suspects'] conduct apart from [that
of innocent people]." The court concluded that none of the conduct ob-
served by the officers "was so beyond the norm of the conduct of innocent
airport passengers as to amount to a reasonable suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity was afoot."' 7 The court analyzed each circumstance individually -
the nervousness, the reference to Northwest Airlines - and held that no
reasonable suspicion existed.' 8
The final significant treatment of the reasonable suspicion issue during the
9. Id.
10. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
II. Saenz, 842 S.W.2d at 287.
12. Brignoni, 422 U.S. at 885.
13. Saenz, 842 S.W.2d at 292.
14. 843 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
15. 803 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
16. Montano, 843 S.W.2d at 582.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 583.
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Survey period occurred in Hawkins v. State. 19 In this case, a Lubbock police
officer observed Hawkins in an area known for street-level drug dealing. The
officer knew that Hawkins had a criminal record. When the officer shined a
light at Hawkins's car, Hawkins reached under his seat. The officer detained
Hawkins who, upon questioning, subsequently removed from his mouth pa-
pers used to wrap user quantities of cocaine. In reversing the trial court's
denial of Hawkins's motion to suppress, the Amarillo Court of Appeals
characterized the circumstances leading up to Hawkins's detention as "no
more than an inarticulate hunch [by the officer] that illegal activity was oc-
curring, or about to occur."' 20 This hunch did not justify the detention of
Hawkins.
C. CONSENT
Consent is a well-established exception to the requirement that police
searches be conducted on authority of a warrant. Two significant cases dur-
ing the Survey period explored the limits of the consent exception. The first
case was Brown v. State,2 1 and the second was Woodberry v. State.22
Brown v. State involved the doctrine of implied consent, an issue of first
impression for the Court of Criminal Appeals. Brown reported to the police
that his wife had been killed by a robber. When the police arrived, they
questioned Brown and conducted a search of his residence. The search un-
covered evidence that led to Brown's indictment as the murderer. He moved
to suppress the evidence because no warrant had been obtained and he did
not give the police express consent to search his residence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Brown's contention that the con-
sent need be express. 23 The court held that, in circumstances where the
owner of the premises reports a crime to the police and suggests that the
crime was committed by a third person, he has impliedly consented to "a
search of the premises reasonably related to the routine investigation of the
offense and the identification of the perpetrator. ' 24 The court specifically
limited the implied consent notion to the initial investigation at the scene.
No consent should be implied for any subsequent search. 25
The issue of who has authority to consent arose in Woodberry v. State.
Woodberry and another man, Scott, were stopped by police on suspicion of
robbery. In response to questioning, Scott informed police that both men
lived in a nearby duplex. The police contacted Scott's wife, who consented
to a search of the entire duplex, even though Woodberry lived in one bed-
room and paid monthly rent for the room. The search of Woodberry's room
uncovered incriminating evidence.
The court concluded that Mrs. Scott lacked sufficient authority and con-
19. 853 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no pet.).
20. Id. at 602.
21. 856 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
22. 856 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no pet.).





trol over Woodberry's room to consent to the search. 26 Though she had
access to Woodberry's room for cleaning purposes she, like a hotel manager
or a landlord, had no authority to consent to a search of Woodberry's
room.27 The court focused on the State's failure to adduce "clear and con-
vincing evidence" that Mrs. Scott did anything but clean the room. She did
not have the sort of complete access sufficient to consent to a search. 28
D. GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
Grand jury subpoenas are a commonly used method to gather evidence in
a criminal investigation. However, their use is typically confined to white
collar or economic crime investigations. In Thurman v. Texas2 9 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals considered the propriety of a grand jury subpoena in
an unusual context - a driving while intoxicated prosecution.
Thurman was involved in a one car collision. A paramedic at the scene
smelled alcohol on his breath. Thurman was treated for injuries at the hos-
pital. During his visit, medical personnel also took blood samples and tested
the samples for alcohol and drugs. The tests revealed a blood/alcohol level
of .219. The state used a grand jury subpoena to obtain the test results.
Subsequently, a grand jury charged Thurman with DWI.
The Houston court first rejected Thurman's claim that he had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the medical records of the blood test. The
court relied heavily on the absence of a physician/patient privilege in crimi-
nal cases. 30 The court went on to conclude that the state had not abused the
grand jury process in obtaining Thurman's medical records. 3 1 The court,
however, noted that "the opportunity for abuse is great." Thus, the court
urged the legislature to adopt some safeguards "to balance the right to pri-
vacy with the need to investigate crime freely."' 32
E. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Prior Survey articles have suggested the need for defendants to invoke
Texas Constitutional provisions to challenge improper police conduct. 33 In-
deed, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Heitman v. State34 seemed to invite
such challenges with its statement that the Texas Constitution "was not in-
tended by our founding fathers to mirror that of the federal government. ' 35
The seed Heitman planted for defendants, however, did not bear significant
fruit during the Survey period. In cases where a Heitman-type challenge
26. Woodberry, 856 S.W.2d at 456.
27. Id. at 457.
28. Id. at 456-57.
29. 861 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.).
30. Id. at 99.
31. Id. at 100.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Gary A. Udashen & Robert Udashen, Criminal Procedure. Confession,
Search & Seizure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1237 (1992).
34. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
35. Id. at 690.
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arose, the court did not reach a different result than it would have reached
under the federal constitution. In Muniz v. State,36 for example, the Court
of Criminal Appeals held that it was error for the court of appeals to fail to
address Muniz's claim that a police search violated the Texas Constitution. 37
The court remanded the case to allow the lower court to consider the state
constitutional argument. However, on remand, the court of appeals refused
to afford Muniz any additional rights under the Texas Constitution with
respect to a hearing on the truthfulness of the statements contained in a
search warrant affidavit than those provided in Franks v. Delaware38 and the
U.S. Constitution.39
The court reached a similar result in Aycock v. State.4° A drug sniffing
dog alerted on Aycock's luggage during a customs check of a flight from
Houston to Belize. Customs officers searched the bag and discovered co-
caine. Aycock challenged the search under both the federal and state
constitutions.
The court noted its independent review obligations under Heitman, but
also noted that, since Heitman, "the Court of Criminal Appeals has not in-
terpreted Article 1, Section 9 of our state constitution any differently than
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. ' 4' In upholding the pro-
priety of the search of Aycock, the court specifically held that "the Texas
Constitution does not guarantee an individual any greater rights at the bor-
der against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the United States
Constitution." 42 These cases do not remove the need for defendants to make
constitutional challenges based on the Texas Constitution. However, the
current trends in the cases suggest that such challenges will rarely be
successful.
F. ATTENUATION DOCTRINE
Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no
evidence obtained by illegal means is admissible against an accused in a
criminal case. 43 In Garcia v. State44 a plurality of the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the notion that the evidence would have been inevitably
discovered by lawful means is not an exception to Article 38.23. 45 The only
exception is the one specifically identified in the statute - when the arrest-
ing officer is acting in good faith reliance on a warrant. 46
The plurality opinion in Garcia led to some arguments that the attenua-
tion doctrine no longer had viability under Texas law. The attenuation doc-
36. 852 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
37. Id.
38. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
39. Muniz v. State, 865 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no pet.).
40. 863 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. filed).
41. Id. at 185.
42. Id. at 186.
43. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
44. 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 799.
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trine is the notion that a piece of evidence could be so removed or
"attenuated" from illegal police conduct so as to render it admissible. Two
cases during the Survey period clearly reject the view that the attenuation
doctrine has not survived Garcia.
In State v. Johnson47 the trial court suppressed a post-arrest statement of
the defendant. The district court ruled that the police had illegally arrested
the defendant. The statement at issue, though made quite some time after
the arrest, could not be saved by the attenuation doctrine because the trial
court concluded that the doctrine had been overruled by Garcia.
The Johnson appellate court refused to read Garcia as abolishing the at-
tenuation doctrine. 48 According to the Johnson court, "Garcia should there-
fore be limited to its specific holding, i.e., the inevitable discovery rule is not
an exception to Article 38.23." 49 The court reasoned that Article 38.23 is a
bar to illegally gathered evidence. If the evidence is attenuated from the
taint of illegality, it is not, by definition, illegally obtained. 50 The Dallas
Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Welcome v. State.51
G. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION
Article 38.23 provides for more than simply the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence. It also provides that, if the evidence raises an issue of
whether the evidence was legally obtained, the jury shall be instructed that if
it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained ille-
gally, then the jury shall disregard any such evidence. 52 This provision
transfers considerable authority to the jury in deciding the legality of
evidence.
In Patterson v. State53 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the provi-
sions of Article 38.23 are mandatory and "when an issue of fact is raised as
to compulsion or persuasion in obtaining a confession, a defendant has a
statutory right to have the jury charged accordingly."' 54 In Patterson's case
the judge had simply instructed the jury that his confession could only be
used against him if it was freely and voluntarily made. The court did not
instruct the jury as to which party bore the burden of proving the legality of
the statement. The court also did not inform the jury as to the standard of
proof it should apply in deciding whether to consider the statement or not.
The El Paso court held that the trial court's failure to so instruct the jury
was error because the court concluded that there was "some harm" to Pat-
terson in the trial court's action, and the appellate court reversed his
conviction. 55
47. 843 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no pet.).
48. Id. at 258.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 865 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.).
52. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
53. 847 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no pet.).
54. Id. at 352.




The Fourth Amendment prohibits only those seizures that are "unreason-
able."'5 6 A "suspicionless search" - one done without a warrant and in the
absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion - is not per se unreasona-
ble. Rather, such a search is judged under the balancing test of Brown v.
Texas.57 Brown sets forth three factors that must be analyzed in the context
of a suspicionless search: (1) the asserted state interest; (2) the level of intru-
sion on individual privacy; and (3) the effectiveness of the procedure in
achieving its stated goal.5 8
A classic form of suspicionless search is the police roadblock. These occur
with some frequency. During the Survey period, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals considered the propriety of a driver's license and insurance check road-
block that led to the discovery of over fifty pounds of marijuana.
State v. Sanchez5 9 involved a roadblock set up by four Texas Department
of Public Safety officers in Victoria County. The officers had no authoriza-
tion from a superior officer nor did they act in accordance with established
procedure. Moreover, the state adduced no evidence demonstrating the ef-
fectiveness of the roadblock in identifying violators. The court stated:
In the absence of evidence of authoritatively standardized procedure
followed in operating the subject roadblock in order to serve its stated
purpose and minimize the officers' discretion, and in the absence of tes-
timony or empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of the
roadblock, we hold [that] the roadblock was [un]reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 6°
II. FEDERAL CASES
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
1. What Constitutes a Seizure
During the Survey period, the Court decided Soldal v. Cook County, Illi-
nois.6 1 Soldal was a case that defined further what actions constitute a
"seizure" of property for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 62 The issue in Soldal was whether the seizure and re-
moval of the Soldals' trailer home from a rented lot in a mobile home park
violated the Soldals' Fourth Amendment rights.
The owner and the manager of the mobile home park filed an eviction
proceeding in Illinois state court in May of 1987 against the Soldals. Under
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
58. Id. at 50-51.
59. 856 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
60. Id. at 170.
61. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
62. "The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth [Amend-
ment] provides in pertinent part that the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
•... 1 1 Id. at 543.
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the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act,63 a tenant cannot be dispos-
sessed from his premises without a judgment of eviction being entered
against him. Although this suit was dismissed in June of 1987, the owner
and the manager filed a second eviction proceeding in August of 1987, as-
serting nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial in late September of
1987.
Rather than wait for a judgment to be entered in their favor, the owner
and the manager made the decision to forcibly evict the Soldals from the
mobil home park. Two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing, the manager
notified the Cook County's Sheriff's Department of her plans to remove the
Soldals' trailer home from the mobile home park, and she requested that
sheriff deputies be present to forestall any resistance. Later that same day,
two of the owner's employees, accompanied by a Cook County sheriff dep-
uty, arrived at the Soldals' trailer home. "The employees proceeded to
wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer home,
disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the
home to a tractor" 64 with all actions occurring in the presence of the deputy.
The trailer home was then towed onto the street.
The United States Supreme Court began its review by defining a "seizure"
of property as "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property. ' 65 The Court noted that" 'at the very core' of the
Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home.' ",66 The Court wryly observed that the Soldals' trailer home was not
only seized, it was "literally carried away, giving new meaning to the term
'mobile home.' ",67 The Court further added that it failed "to see how being
unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner alleged to have
occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment." 68
The Court voiced its disagreement with the Seventh Circuit's definition of
"seizure." The Court went to great lengths to distinguish past Court opin-
ions to show that these cases did not support the view, as put forward by the
Seventh Circuit, that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
seizures of property only in situations where liberty or privacy are also im-
plicated. 69 The Court pointed to its "plain view" decisions to show that
such construction of the Fourth Amendment was untenable. 70
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, T 9-101-9-321 (1991).
64. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 541.
65. Id. at 543 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
66. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
67. Id.
68. Id. However, the Court added that the question of whether the Fourth Amendment
was in fact violated requires determining if the seizure was reasonable, which would entail
weighing various factors that were not before the Court in Soldal. Id.
69. Id. at 544-45.
70. If the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights
of privacy, "plain view" seizures would not implicate that constitutional provi-
sion at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view" seizures have
been scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry ... The plain view
1994]
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2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
On its face, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for any search or
seizure. However, there are numerous exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. Minnesota v. Dickerson71 focused upon the so-called "plain feel" ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 72 The issue in
Dickerson was whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of con-
traband detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective
patdown search.
On the evening of November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis, Minnesota police
officers saw Dickerson leaving an apartment complex which was familiar to
one of the officers as a "crack house." Upon spotting the police car and
making eye contact with one of the police officers, Dickerson abruptly
stopped, changed direction and entered an alley. Because Dickerson's ac-
tions were suspicious and he had just left a building which was known for its
trafficking of cocaine, the officers decided to stop Dickerson and investigate
further.
The officers pulled their car into the alley and ordered Dickerson to stop
and to submit to a patdown search. The officer who conducted the search
found no weapons but felt a small lump in Dickerson's nylon jacket. He
examined it with his fingers and, believing it to be a lump of crack cocaine,
reached into Dickerson's pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing
crack cocaine. Dickerson was arrested and charged with possession of a
controlled substance.
Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress the cocaine. The trial court
denied this motion. The trial court reasoned that the officers were justified
under Terry v. Ohio7 3 in both stopping Dickerson to investigate whether he
might be engaged in criminal activity, and in frisking him to ensure that he
was not carrying a weapon. Finally, the trial court relied upon the "plain-
feel" exception to warrantless searches and ruled that the seizure of the co-
doctrine "merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment's central re-
quirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property."
Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 546. As to the "plain view" decisions, the Court noted that the Seventh
Circuit had attempted to reconcile its holding in Soldal with these decisions by seemingly
construing the Fourth Amendment to protect only against seizures that are the outcome of a
search. The Court disagreed and held that seizures of property are subject to scrutiny under
the Fourth Amendment even though no search within the meaning of the amendment has
taken place. Id. at 547.
71. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
72. The Fifth Circuit has recognized a so-called "plain feel" or "plain touch" corollary to
the plain-view doctrine. See United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992).
73. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court held that "where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that crimi-
nal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make 'reason-
able inquiries' aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions." Id. at 30. Terry also held that
"when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, the
officer may conduct a patdown search to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon." Id. at 24. Finally, the search "must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for
the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. at 26.
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caine did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 74
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed Dickerson's conviction.
Though finding that the investigative stop and patdown were lawful under
Terry, the court concluded that the officers had exceeded Terry 75 in seizing
the cocaine and, in so concluding, declined to adopt the "plain feel" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. 76 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals' decision and "expressly refused 'to extend the plain
view doctrine to the sense of touch' on the grounds that 'the sense of touch is
inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight' and that
'the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment.' ,,77 In so ruling, the Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted a categorical rule which apparently would bar the
seizure of any contraband detected by an officer through the sense of touch
during a patdown search for weapons. 78
The United States Supreme Court rejected this categorical rule. Analogiz-
ing to the plain view doctrine, 79 the Court used the example of a police of-
ficer who lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object
whose mass or contour makes its identity immediately apparent. In such a
situation, the Court stated, there has not been an invasion of the suspect's
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for a
weapon.80 Therefore, if the object is contraband, the seizure without a war-
rant would be justified by the same practical considerations that are inherent
in the plain view context.8 '
Applying these principles to the facts of Dickerson, however, the Court
74. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
To this Court, there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the officer
uses to conclude that the material is contraband. An experienced officer may
rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell of burning
marijuana in an automobile .... The sense of touch, grounded in experience and
training, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. "Plain feel,"
therefore, is no different than plain view and will equally support the seizure
here.
Id.
75. Id. at 2136. "If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if
the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed." Id.
(citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)).
76. Id. at 2134.
77. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W. 2d 840, 845 (1992)).
78. Id.
79. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
The rationale of the plain view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view
and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment - or at least no search independent of the
initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. (citations omitted.)
The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is
deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such
circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to promote the
objectives of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
80. Id. at 2139.
81. Id. at 2137.
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concluded that the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that the police
officer in this case went beyond "the bounds of the 'strictly circumscribed'
search for weapons allowed under Terry."'82 Because the officer continued to
explore Dickerson's pocket after having concluded that there was no weapon
present, the court held that this search "was unrelated to 'the sole justifica-
tion of the search [under Terry:] ... the protection of the police and others
nearby.' ",83 The search was thus constitutionally invalid. 84
3. Standing
The final significant case handed down by the Supreme Court during the
Survey period was United States v. Padilla.8 5 Padilla concerned the issue of
co-conspirator standing to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment.8 6 In Padilla, an Arizona police officer spotted a Cadillac on Interstate
Highway 10, and the officer thought the driver acted suspiciously. After
following the Cadillac for several miles, the officer stopped the Cadillac for
driving too slowly. The lone occupant of the car was the driver, but the
insurance card given to the officer by the driver revealed that a United States
customs agent actually owned the Cadillac. Believing that the driver
matched the profile of a drug courier, the officer, who by this time was re-
ceiving assistance from another officer, requested and received the permis-
sion of the driver to search the car. The officers discovered 560 pounds of
cocaine in the trunk and arrested the driver.
The driver agreed to make a controlled delivery of the cocaine and tele-
phoned his contact from a motel. Maria and Jorge Padilla drove to the
motel in response to the phone call, and both were arrested after attempting
to drive away in the Cadillac. Maria Padilla agreed to cooperate with law
enforcement officials and led these officials to the house where her husband,
Xavier Padilla, was staying. The ensuing investigation then connected the
customs agent who owned the Cadillac and his wife to Xavier Padilla. All of
the arrested persons were charged with a narcotics conspiracy. All of the
arrested persons moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the course of
the investigation by claiming that all the evidence was the fruit of the initial
unlawful investigatory stop of the Cadillac on Interstate Highway 10. The
district court upheld these motions to suppress because the defendants were
"involved in a joint venture for transportation ... that had control of the
82. Id. at 2138. The Minnesota Supreme Court closely examined the record and con-
cluded that "the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after 'squeezing, slid-
ing, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket' - a pocket which the
officer already knew contained no weapon." Id. (quoting 481 N.W.2d at 844).
83. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
84. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
85. 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993).
86. The Ninth Circuit was the only Circuit that had recognized co-conspirator standing.
Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1939. "[A] co-conspirator's participation in an operation or arrangement
that indicates joint control and supervision of the place searched establishes standing." Id. at
1938. Under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, "a co-conspirator obtains a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes if he has either a supervisory role in the




contraband. ' 87 The Ninth Circuit relied upon the co-conspirator standing
exception to affirm the district court.88
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.8 9 The
Court recited the long-standing rule that a "defendant can urge the suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if that
defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by
the challenged search or seizure." 90 The Court rejected the co-conspirator
exception and remanded the case so that the lower court could consider
whether each arrested person had either a property interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment that was interfered with by the stop of the Cadillac, or a
reasonable expectation of privacy that was invaded by the search of the
Cadillac. 9 1
B. FIFrH CIRCUIT CASES
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
United States v. Smith 92 concerned warrantless interceptions of conversa-
tions over cordless telephones, devices whose presence in homes and
automobiles has become commonplace. Defendant David Lee Smith lived
next door to Michael Varing. Varing suspected Smith of involvement in re-
cent break-ins at Varing's home. Using a Bearcat scanner to monitor
Smith's cordless phone calls, 9 3 Varing discovered not that Smith was con-
nected to the recent burglaries, but that Smith was a drug dealer. After
Varing contacted a friend in the police department of Port Arthur, Texas, he
was provided some blank cassette tapes and "instructed" by the Port Arthur
police to tape record Smith's calls. On one occasion, police officers were
present with Varing to assist him in intercepting and recording Smith's calls.
The calls which had been intercepted and the tape recordings of these calls
eventually led to Smith's arrest and the arrest of four other defendants on
charges of drug trafficking. Immediately after his arrest, Smith consented to
a search of his residence. The search turned up crack-cocaine, drug para-
phernalia, customer lists, and a loaded .38 calibre revolver. Smith was con-
victed of multiple narcotics violations.
On appeal, Smith argued that the interception of his cordless telephone
conversations violated both Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
87. Id. at 1938 (citing respondent's application for petition for cert. at 22A).
88. Id. at 1936.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1939.
91. Id.
92. 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1620 (1993).
93. A Bearcat scanner is a type of radio receiver which allows the user to monitor
a number of radio frequencies. The scanner sequentially monitors all program-
med frequencies. When a conversation on one of these frequencies is picked up,
the scanner locks in on that frequency to allow the user to listen in. Bearcat
scanners, along with similar scanners made by competitors, are commercially
available at most radio and electronic stores.
Smith, 978 F.2d at 173, n.I.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Streets Act of 1968,94 and the Fourth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit Court
rejected Smith's position.95 The court noted that generally a search has oc-
curred when the government infringes on an expectation of privacy which
society considers reasonable. The court further noted, however, that a mere
subjective expectation of privacy alone is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, the expectation of privacy must be objective: one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.96
The court explained that cordless telephones are difficult to characterize
for Fourth Amendment purposes - whether they are more like traditional
telephones or more like radio transmitters:
This difference is important because the Fourth Amendment clearly
protects communications carried by land-based telephone lines. On the
other hand, pure radio communications are afforded no such protection
because "broadcasting communications into the air by radio waives is
more analogous to carrying on an oral communication in a loud voice
or with a megaphone than it is to the privacy afforded by a wire." 97
The court noted that a cordless telephone does not fit neatly into either cate-
gory.98 The court then discussed earlier cases under Title III which dis-
cussed whether the user of a cordless telephone had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 99 In those earlier cases, it had been decided that the user did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the ease with which cordless
phone conversations could be intercepted and monitored.
The court, however, noted that today's cordless phones are very different
from and not as easily susceptible to being intercepted as the cordless phones
at issue in the earlier cases. Thus, "[a]pplication of the Fourth Amendment
in a given case will depend largely upon the specific technology used, and a
trial court must be prepared to consider that technology in a hearing on a
motion to suppress.'1° The court further instructed courts to keep in mind
that "the issue is not whether it is conceivable that someone could eavesdrop
on a conversation but whether it is reasonable to expect privacy."''1 At
some point, the court noted, as technological advances make cordless com-
munications more private, such communication will be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.10 2
The court stated that Smith had the burden to show that the evidence in
his case was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The
court pointed out that Smith offered no evidence - such as the frequency or
range of the phone - that would demonstrate that his expectation of pri-
vacy was reasonable. Therefore, the district court properly denied his mo-
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
95. Smith, 978 F.2d at 173.
96. Id. at 177.
97. Id. at 177 (quoting United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1973)).
98. Id. at 178.
99. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984).
100. Smith, 978 F.2d at 180.
101. Id. at 179.
102. Id. at 180.
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tion to suppress. 0 3
2. Consent to Search
In United States v. Rich 104 the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of
"whether an individual's affirmative response to a police officer's request to
'have a look in' the individual's automobile is the equivalent of a general
consent to search the automobile and the contents therein, including the in-
dividual's luggage."10 5 With "some reluctance" the court held that such a
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.10 6
On the night of January 16, 1991, the defendant, William Rich, was
stopped by a Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper so that the trooper
could issue Rich a warning citation for the burned out light bulb on Rich's
license plate. After being stopped, Rich volunteered that he was traveling to
Mesquite, Texas "just for the day" even though there were clothes hanging
on the passenger side, a travel bag sitting on the passenger side floorboard,
and two suitcases sitting behind the seat in the extended cab portion of the
cab, all in plain view when the trooper flashed his flashlight into the automo-
bile. The trooper also detected the smell of fabric softener, which he knew
was often used by narcotics smugglers to mask the scent of marijuana. The
trooper again asked Rich how long he planned on staying in Mesquite. This
time, Rich answered "a couple of days." When Rich handed the trooper his
insurance papers, Rich's hands were trembling to the point that the papers
were rattling.
The trooper was unable to have a license check run on Rich's plates due to
a computer malfunction. The trooper asked Rich whether he had any nar-
cotics or weapons in his vehicle. Rich answered that he did not. The
trooper then asked Rich, "Can I have a look in your truck?" Rich looked at
the ground and did not answer. The trooper repeated the question. Again,
Rich did not answer. Finally, after the trooper asked yet a third time and
told Rich that he needed either "a yes or a no," Rich said "yes" and the
trooper then proceeded to search the automobile. Immediately, he pulled
out one of the suitcases and opened it, finding marijuana packed in fabric
softener tissues. Ninety-two pounds of marijuana were eventually taken
from the truck. Rich was read his Miranda warnings and arrested. The
time from the initial stop to the arrest was no more than five minutes.
The Fifth Circuit set out the standard for determining the scope of con-
sent: "The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness. The key in-
quiry focuses on what the typical reasonable person [would] have under-
stood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect."'10 7 Rich argued
that the trooper's request to "have a look in" the truck was, under the stan-
103. Id.
104. 992 F.2d 502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 348 (1993).
105. Id. at 503.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
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dard of objective reasonableness, only a request to "see inside" the vehicle.
The district court similarly based its decision to suppress in part on the fail-
ure of the trooper to use the more precise term "search" when making his
request.
The Fifth Circuit did not agree with either Rich's argument or the district
court's decision.' 08 The court noted that several other circuits have held
that a request to "look in" or "look through" a vehicle is equivalent to a
request to "search" the vehicle.' 0 9 The court then established a similar rule
for the Fifth Circuit:
[I]t is not necessary for an officer specifically to use the term "search"
when he requests consent from an individual to search a vehicle. We
hold that any words, when viewed in context, that objectively commu-
nicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is requesting permission
to examine the vehicle and its contents constitute a valid search request
for Fourth Amendment purposes."I 0
After considering the factual circumstances of Rich, the court held that the
trooper's request to "have a look in" Rich's truck effectively communicated
to him that the trooper was asking for Rich's consent to search the
vehicle. IIl
Rich further argued that he did not know that the trooper was searching
for drugs in that the trooper did not expressly inform him that he wanted to
search the car for drugs, and therefore Rich's general consent to search the
automobile could not be interpreted as extending to any containers within
the automobile which might bear drugs. The district court decided to grant
Rich's motion to suppress, in part, because of its conclusion that the trooper
did not tell Rich that he wanted to search the automobile for drugs. The
Fifth Circuit, again, rejected a narrow or technical view of consent:
When the conversation between [the trooper] and Rich is considered in
toto, it is indisputable that Rich knew that the object of [the trooper's]
search was illegal weapons or narcotics . . . . [A]fter the defendant
handed his insurance papers to [the trooper], [the trooper] asked him if
he had any narcotics or weapons in the vehicle; the defendant answered
"no." The officer then asked, for the first of three times, if he could
"have a look in" the defendant's truck .... In the light of the fact that
the entire scenario was played out in a matter of minutes . . . it is
unreasonable to assume a period of silence ensued that was long enough
to disassociate the two sentences from each other .... [I]f, as a result of
the verbal exchange, an objectively reasonable individual would under-
108. Id. at 507.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991).
110. Rich, 992 F.2d at 506.
111. Id.
Rich had observed [the trooper] shining his flashlight not only into the tinted
window but into the open driver's side window of the truck and studying the
truck's interior for at least thirty seconds; thus [the trooper] had already 'seen
inside' the truck and an objectively reasonable person would assume at this
point that [the trooper] was requesting permission to look further.
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stand the object of the officer's search, then the object of the search has
been sufficiently delineated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."l 2
3. Pre-Presentment Detention
At issue in United States v. Adekunle" 13 was how long someone suspected
of alimentary canal drug smuggling may be detained before presentment to a
neutral judicial officer must take place in order to determine that reasonable
suspicion exists to support the continued detention. Adekunle and a com-
panion, Masha," 4 were detained by customs officials in Brownsville, Texas
because they were suspected of being alimentary canal drug smugglers. Af-
ter being taken to a hospital for observation, a magistrate judge ordered that
Adekunle and Masha be subjected to an x-ray. Attending physicians then
administered laxatives to Adekunle and Masha, which caused both to ex-
crete numerous balloons containing heroin. Both were then arrested. After
excreting all of the balloons, they were taken to the local jail and presented
before the magistrate judge. This presentment took place more than 100
hours after the initial detention and more than two days after their arrest.
Adekunle did not dispute that customs officials had a reasonable suspicion
to detain him under suspicion of drug smuggling. Rather, Adekunle main-
tained that once the reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause, he
was no longer simply a subject of investigatory detention, but was instead
under arrest. Adekunle therefore contended that the customs officials failed
to timely provide him with the procedural protections required for warrant-
less arrests, and that this failure required suppression of any statements
made during the period of detention.
The Fifth Circuit answered Adekunle's argument by stating that basic
Fourth Amendment principles require the government, after detaining a per-
son suspected of alimentary canal drug smuggling, to seek within a reason-
able period a judicial determination that reasonable suspicion exists to
support the detention:
The [Fourth [A]mendment does not require a formal adversary hear-
ing for such a determination; informal presentation of the evidence sup-
porting the customs agent's suspicion before a neutral and detached
judicial officer satisfies the concerns underlying the [F]ourth
[A]mendment. Failure to obtain such a judicial determination within
48 hours shifts the burden to the government to demonstrate a bona fide
emergency or extraordinary circumstance justifying the lengthier
delay. 115
Under this standard, the court held that Adekunle's detention passed
"constitutional muster" because customs officials brought the matter within
48 hours before a magistrate judge who ordered an x-ray. 116 The court rea-
112. Id. at 506-07.
113. 2 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1993).
114. The issues raised in Adekunle were raised only by Adekunle. Masha did not raise any
issues before the Fifth Circuit which were addressed in Adekunle.




soned that this order of an x-ray by the magistrate judge "demonstrated an
implicit determination that there was reasonable suspicion to warrant the
continued detention. ' 17 Adekunle's conviction was therefore affirmed. 18
4. Standard of Review for Motion to Suppress
The appropriate standard for appellate review of a motion to suppress
predicated on a defective warrant was articulated with clarity by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Pofahl.119 Pofahl argued that the district court
erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence which was seized from
three of her residences in California. She argued that the affidavits which
supported the warrants did not establish probable cause. Pofahl challenged
the affidavits on the basis that they charged her husband, Charles Pofahl,
and another man with criminal activities in Texas, but failed to allege that
she engaged in any illegal conduct or that any illegal conduct took place in
California. Pofahl argued that the affidavits thereby failed to establish a
nexus between her California residences and the evidence sought there by
officials.
The Fifth Circuit set out a general standard for reviewing the district
court's denial of the motion to suppress:
[W]e review the denial of the motion to determine (1) whether the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and (2) whether
the warrant was supported by probable cause. However, it is unneces-
sary to address the probable cause issue if the good-faith exception ap-
plies, unless the case involves a "novel question of law whose resolution
is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and
magistrates." 120
The case did not involve a novel question of law and the court ultimately
concluded that the officers acted in good faith reliance on the warrants.121
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 226 (1993), and 114 S. Ct. 560
(1993).
120. Id. at 1473 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (1983)) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 1474.
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